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Abstract
We specify an experts algorithm with the fol-
lowing characteristics: (a) it uses only feed-
back from the actions actually chosen (ban-
dit setup), (b) it can be applied with count-
ably infinite expert classes, and (c) it copes
with losses that may grow in time appropri-
ately slowly. We prove loss bounds against
an adaptive adversary. From this, we obtain
master algorithms for “active experts prob-
lems”, which means that the master’s actions
may influence the behavior of the adversary.
Our algorithm can significantly outperform
standard experts algorithms on such prob-
lems. Finally, we combine it with a univer-
sal expert class. This results in a (compu-
tationally infeasible) universal master algo-
rithm which performs – in a certain sense –
almost as well as any computable strategy,
for any online problem.
Keywords. Prediction with expert advice,
responsive environments, partial observation
game, bandits, universal learning, asymp-
totic optimality.
1. Introduction
Expert algorithms have been popular since about fif-
teen years ago [LW89]. They are appropriate for on-
line prediction or repeated decision making or repeated
game playing (we call these setups online problems for
brevity), based on a class of “experts”. In each round,
each expert gives a recommendation. From this, we de-
rive a master decision. After that, losses (or rewards)
are assigned to each expert by the environment, also
called adversary. Our goal is to perform almost as
well as the best expert in hindsight in the long run. In
other words, we try to minimize the regret.
The early papers deal with the full information game,
where we get to know the losses of each expert af-
ter each round. The analysis holds for the worst
case, where the environment is fully adversarial and
tries to maximize our regret in the long run. Later,
[ACBFS95] gave a worst-case analysis for the bandit
setup, where the master algorithm knows only the loss
of its own decision after each round. This has been
further generalized to label-efficient prediction [HP97]
and partial monitoring [CBLS04].
Recently, [FM04] introduced a strategic experts algo-
rithm which performs well for a broader class of envi-
ronments. The algorithm has still asymptotically op-
timal properties against a worst-case adversary. Addi-
tionally, it may perform much better than a standard
experts algorithm in more favorable situations, when
the actions influence the behavior of the environment.
We refer to these as active experts problems. One ex-
ample is the repeated prisoner’s dilemma when the op-
ponent is willing to cooperate under certain conditions
(see Section 5 for some details). However, [FM04] give
only asymptotic guarantees, but no convergence rate.
In this paper, we introduce a different algorithm for ac-
tive experts problems with the same asymptotic guar-
antees, but in addition a convergence rate (of t−
1
10 )
is shown. Both algorithm and analysis are assembled
from a standard “toolkit”, basing on [KV03, MB04].
The basic idea is the following: We use the bandit
experts algorithm by [MB04], but allow the losses to
increase with time t. This allows us to give control to
one expert for an increasing period of time steps.
Secondly, we generalize our analysis to the case of in-
finitely many experts, basing on [HP04b]. The master
algorithm stays computable (if the experts are), since
only a finite (with time increasing) number of experts
is involved. Allowing infinitely many experts also per-
mits to define a universal expert class by means of all
programs on some universal Turing machine. (This
construction is quite common in Algorithmic Informa-
tion Theory, see e.g. [Hut04].) Thus, we obtain a uni-
versal master algorithm, which we show to perform in a
certain sense almost as well as any computable strategy
on any online problem. Thus, we introduce a new ap-
proach to universal artificial intelligence, which is in a
sense dual to the AIXI model based on Bayesian learn-
ing [Hut04]. Although the master algorithm is com-
putable, the resulting universal agent is not (like the
AIXI model), since the experts may be non-responsive.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the problem setup, the notation, and the algo-
rithm. In Sections 3 and 4, we give the (worst-case)
analysis for finite and infinite expert classes. The im-
plications to active experts problems and a universal
master algorithms are given in Section 5. Section 6
contains discussion and conclusions.
2. The Algorithm
Our task is an online decision problem. That is, we
have to make a sequence of decisions, each of which
results in a certain loss we incur. “We” is an abbre-
viation for the master algorithm which is to be de-
signed. For concreteness, you may imagine the task of
playing a game repeatedly. In each round, i.e. at each
time step t, we have access to the recommendations of
n∈N∪{∞} “experts” or strategies. We do not specify
what exactly a “recommendation” is – we just follow
the advice of one expert. Before we reveal our move,
the adversary has to assign losses ℓit≥0 to all experts
i. There is an upper bound Bt on the maximum loss
the adversary may use, i.e. ℓt∈ [0,Bt]n. This quantity
may depend on t and is known to us. After the move,
only the loss of the selected expert i is revealed. This
is the bandit setup, as opposed to the full information
game where we get to know the losses all experts. Our
goal is to perform nearly as well as the best available
strategy in terms of cumulative loss, after any num-
ber T of time steps which is not known in advance.
The difference between our loss and the loss of some
expert is also termed regret. We consider the general
case of an adaptive adversary, which may assign losses
depending on our past decisions.
If there is a finite number n of experts or strategies,
then it is common to give no prior preferences to any
of them. Formally, we define prior weights wi = 1
n
.
Moreover, we define the complexity of expert i as ki=
−lnwi. This arises in the full observation game, where
the regret can be bounded by some function of the
best expert’s complexity. On the other hand, if there
are reasons not to trust all strategies equally in the
beginning, we may use a non-uniform prior w. This
is mandatory for infinitely many experts. We then
require wi>0 for all experts i and
∑
iw
i≤1.
For t=1,2,3,...
Sample rt∈{0,1} independently s.t. P [rt=1]=γt
If rt=0 Then
Play FPL(t)’s decision (IFoEt :=I
FPL
t )
Set ℓˆit=0 for all 1≤ i≤n
Else
Sample IFoEt ∈{1...n} uniformly & play I:=IFoEt
Let ℓˆIt =ℓ
I
tn/γt and ℓˆ
i
t=0 for all i 6=I
Figure 1. The algorithm FoE
Sample qit
d.∼Exp independently for 1≤ i≤n
select and play IFPLt =arg min
1≤i≤n
{ηtℓˆi<t+ki−qit}
Figure 2. The algorithm FPL(t)
Our algorithm “Follow or Explore” (FoE ) builds on
McMahan and Blum’s online geometric optimization
algorithm. (For finite n and uniform prior, it even is
their algorithm, save for the adaptive parameters.) It
is a bandit version of a “Follow the Perturbed Leader”
experts algorithm. This approach to online predic-
tion and playing repeated games has been pioneered
by [Han57]. For the full observation game, [KV03]
gave a very elegant analysis which is distinct from the
standard analysis of exponential weighting schemes.
It is particularly handy if the learning rate is dynamic
rather than fixed in advance. A dynamic learning rate
is necessary if there is no target time T known in ad-
vance.
The algorithm is composed of two standard ingredi-
ents: exploration and follow the (perturbed) leader.
Since we are playing the bandit game (as opposed to
the full information game), we need to explore suffi-
ciently. Otherwise, there could be a strategy which
we think is poor (and thus never play), but in reality
it is good. At each time step t, we decide randomly
according to some exploration rate γt∈ (0,1) whether
to explore or not. If so, we choose an expert accord-
ing to the uniform distribution (or the prior distribu-
tion, compare (5), in case of non-uniform priors). Af-
ter observing the loss of the selected expert, we want
to give an unbiased estimate of the true loss vector.
We achieve that by dividing the observed loss by the
probability of exploring this expert, and estimate the
unobserved losses of all other experts by zero. We call
the resulting loss vector ℓˆt.
When not exploring, we follow some strategy which
performed well in the past. It may be not advisable
to pick always the best strategy so far - the adver-
sary could fool us in this case. Instead we intro-
duce a perturbation for each expert and follow the
advice of the strategy with the best perturbed score.
In order to assign a score to each expert, note that
we have only access to the estimated losses ℓˆt. Let
ℓˆi<T =
∑T−1
t=1 ℓˆ
i
t be the estimated cumulative past loss
of expert i. Then his complexity-penalized score is
defined as ηT ℓˆ
i
<T+k
i, i.e. high scores are bad. Here,
ηT >0 is the learning rate. The perturbed score is then
given by ηT ℓˆ
i
<T+k
i−qi, where the perturbations qi are
chosen independently exponentially distributed. This
ensures a convenient analysis.
The algorithms “Follow or Explore” FoE and “Follow
the perturbed Leader” FPL are fully specified in Fig-
ures 1 and 2. Note that each time randomness is used,
it is assumed to be independent of the past random-
ness. Note also that all algorithms occurring in this
paper work with the estimated losses ℓˆ. We may eval-
uate their performance in terms of true or estimated
losses, this is specified in the notation. E.g. for the
true loss of FPL up to and including time T we write
LFPL=ℓFPL1:T , while the estimated loss is Lˆ
FPL= ℓˆFPL1:T .
3. Analysis for Uniform Prior
In this section we assume a uniform prior w≡ 1
n
over
finitely many experts. (The general case is treated in
the next section.) We assume that Bt≥ 0 is some se-
quence of upper bounds on the true losses, γt ∈ (0,1)
is a sequence of exploration rates, and ηt> 0 is a de-
creasing sequence of learning rates.
The analysis is according to the following diagram:
LFoE<∼EL
FoE<
∼EL
FPL<
∼ELˆ
FPL<
∼ELˆ
IFPL<
∼Lˆ
best<
∼L
best (1)
The symbol L is used informally for the cumulative
loss ℓ1:T . Each “<∼” means that we bound the quan-
tity on the left by the quantity on the right plus some
additive terms. The first and the last expressions are
the losses of the FoE algorithm and the best expert,
respectively. The intermediate quantities belong to
different algorithms, namely FoE , FPL, and a third
one called IFPL for “infeasible” FPL [KV03]. IFPL is
the same as FPL except that it has access to an oracle
providing the current estimated loss vector ℓˆt (hence
infeasible). Then it assigns scores of ηtℓˆ
i
1:t+k
i−qit in-
stead of ηtℓˆ
i
<t+k
i−qit. We assume that IFPL uses the
same randomization as FPL (i.e. the respective qt are
the same).
The randomization of FoE and FPL gives rise to
two filters of σ-algebras. By At for t ≥ 0 we de-
note the σ-algebra generated by the FoE ’s random-
ness {u1:t,r1:t} up to time t. We may also write
A=⋃t≥0At. Similarly, Bt is the σ-algebra generated
by the FoE ’s and FPL’s randomness up to time t (i.e.
Bt=̂{u1:t,r1:t,q1:t}). Then clearly At⊂Bt for each t.
The arguments below rely on conditional expectations
– the expectations in (1) should also be understood
conditional. In particular we will often need the con-
ditional expectations with respect to FoE ’s past ran-
domness At−1, abbreviated as
Et[X ] := E[X |At−1],
where X is some random variable. Then Et[X ] is an
At−1-measurable random variable, meaning that its
value is determined for fixed past randomness At−1.
Note in particular that the estimated loss vectors ℓˆit
are random vectors which depend on FoE ’s random-
ness At up to time t (only). In this way, FoE ’s (and
FPL’s and IFPL’s) actions depend on FoE ’s past ran-
domness. Note, however, that they do not depend on
FPL’s randomness q1:t. Finally, I
FoE
t and ℓ
FoE
t are A′t
measurable, i.e. depend on u<t,r<t,qt, but are inde-
pendent of q<t.
We now start proving the diagram (1). It is helpful
to consider each intermediate algorithm as a stand-
alone procedure which is actually executed (with an
oracle if necessary) and has the asserted performance
guarantees (e.g. in terms of expected losses).
Lemma 1
[
LFoE<∼EL
FoE
]
For each T ≥ 1 and δT ∈
(0,1), with probability at least 1− δT2 , we have
ℓFoE1:T ≤
t∑
t=1
Etℓ
FoE
t +
√
(2 ln 4
δT
)
∑T
t=1B
2
t .
Proof. The sequence of random variables XT =∑T
t=1
[
ℓFoEt −EtℓFoEt
]
is a martingale with respect
to the filter Bt (not At!). In order to see this,
observe E[ℓFoET |BT−1] = E
(
E[ℓFoET |AT−1]
∣∣BT−1) and
E[ℓFoEt |BT−1]=ℓFoEt for t<T , which implies
E(XT |BT−1) =
=
∑T
t=1
(
E[ℓFoEt |BT−1]−E
[
E[ℓFoEt |At−1]
∣∣BT−1])
=
∑T−1
t=1
(
ℓFoEt −E[ℓFoEt |At−1]
)
= XT−1.
Its differences are bounded: |Xt−Xt−1|≤Bt. Hence,
it follows from Azuma’s inequality that the probability
that XT exceeds some λ>0 is bounded by p=2exp
(−
λ2
2
∑
tB
2
t
)
. Requesting δT2 =p and solving for λ gives the
assertion. ✷
The relation ELFoE<∼EL
FPL follows immediately from
the specification of the algorithm FoE .
Lemma 2
[
ELFoE<∼EL
FPL
]
For each t ≥ 1, we have
Etℓ
FoE
t ≤(1−γt)EtℓFPLt +γtBt.
The next lemma relating ELFPL and ELˆFPL is technical
but intuitively clear. It states that in (conditional)
expectation, the real loss suffered by FPL is the same
as the estimated loss. This is simply because the loss
estimate is unbiased. A combination with the previous
lemma was shown in [MB04].
Lemma 3
[
ELFPL<∼ELˆ
FPL
]
For each t ≥ 1, we have
Etℓ
FPL
t =Etℓˆ
FPL
t .
Note that ℓˆFPLt is the loss ℓˆ
I
t estimated by FoE , but for
the expert I=IFPLt chosen by FPL.
Proof. Let f it = f
i
t (At−1) =P[IFPLt = i|At−1] be the
probability distribution over actions i which FPL uses
at time t, depending on the past randomness At−1.
Let ut=[1...1]/n be the uniform distribution at time t
(for non-uniform weights this will be replaced appro-
priately later). Then
Et[ℓˆ
FPL
t ] =γt
∑n
i=1f
i
t [(1− uit) · 0 + uitℓˆit|rt=1∧IFoEt =i]
=
∑n
i=1f
i
t ℓ
i
t = Et[ℓ
FPL
t ],
where ℓˆit|rt=1∧IFoEt =i = ℓ
i
t/(u
i
tγt) is the estimated loss
under the condition that FoE decided to explore (rt=
1) and chose action IFoEt = i. ✷
The following lemma from [KV03] relates the losses of
FPL and IFPL. We repeat the proof, since it is the
crucial and only step in the analysis where we have
to be careful with the upper loss bound Bt. Let Bˆt=
Bt(n/γt) denote the upper bound on the instantaneous
estimated losses.
Lemma 4
[
ELˆFPL<∼ELˆ
IFPL
]
Etℓˆ
FPL
t ≤EtℓˆIFPLt +γtηtBˆ2t
holds for all t≥1.
Proof. If rt = 0, ℓˆt = 0 and thus ℓˆ
FPL
t = ℓˆ
IFPL
t holds.
This happens with probability 1−γt. Otherwise we
have
Etℓˆ
FPL
t =
n∑
i=1
∫
1IIFPLt =i
ℓˆitdµ(x), (2)
where µ denotes the (exponential) distribution of the
perturbations, i.e. xi :=q
i
t and density µ(x) :=e
−‖x‖∞ .
The idea is now that if action i was selected by FPL,
it is – because of the exponentially distributed pertur-
bation – with high probability also selected by IFPL.
Formally, we write u+ = max(u,0) for u ∈ R, abbre-
viate λ = ℓˆ<t+k/ηt, and denote by
∫
...dµ(x6=i) the
integration leaving out the ith action. Then, using
ηtλi−xi≤ηtλj−xj for all j if IFPLt = i in the first line,
and Bˆt≥ ℓˆit− ℓˆjt in the fourth line, we get∫
1IIFPLt =i
ℓˆitdµ(x) =
∫ ∫
xi≥max
j 6=i
{ηt(λi−λj)+xj}
ℓˆitdµ(xi)dµ(x6=i)
=
∫
ℓˆit e
−(max
j 6=i
{ηt(λi−λj)+xj})
+
dµ(x6=i)
≤
∫
ℓˆit e
ηtBˆte
−(max
j 6=i
{ηt(λi−λj)+xj}+ηtBˆt)
+
dµ(x6=i)
≤ eηtBˆt
∫
ℓˆit e
−(max
j 6=i
{ηt(λi+ℓˆ
i
t−λj−ℓˆ
j
t)+xj})
+
dµ(x6=i)
= eηtBˆt
∫
1IIIFPLt =i
ℓˆitdµ(x).
Summing over i and using the analogue of (2) for IFPL,
we see that if rt=1, then Etℓˆ
FPL
t ≤eηtBˆtEtℓˆIFPLt holds.
Thus Etℓˆ
IFPL
t ≥ e−ηtBˆtEtℓˆFPLt ≥ (1− ηtBˆt)EtℓˆFPLt ≥
Etℓˆ
FPL
t −ηtBˆ2t . The assertion now follows by taking
expectations w.r.t rt. ✷
The next lemma relates the losses of IFPL and the best
action in hindsight. For an oblivious adversary (which
means that the adversary’s decisions do not depend on
our past actions), the proof was given in [KV03]. An
additional step is necessary for an adaptive adversary.
We omit the proof here, the reader may reconstruct it
from the proof of Lemma 9.
Lemma 5
[
ELˆIFPL<∼Lˆ
best
]
Assume decreasing learn-
ing rate ηt and
∑
ie
−ki≤1. For all T≥1 and 1≤i≤n,
we have
∑T
t=1Etℓˆ
IFPL
t ≤ ℓˆi1:T+ k
i
ηT
(recall that ℓˆi1:T is a
random variable depending on At).
Finally, we give a relation between the estimated and
true losses, adapted from [MB04].
Lemma 6
[
Lˆbest<∼L
best
]
For each T≥1, δT ∈(0,1), and
1≤ i≤n, w.p. at least 1− δT2 we have
ℓˆi1:T ≤ ℓi1:T +
√
(2 ln 4
δT
)
∑T
t=1 Bˆ
2
t . (3)
Proof. Xt= ℓˆ
i
1:t−ℓi1:t is a martingale, since
E[Xt|At−1] = E[ℓˆi1:t|At−1]− ℓi1:t
= Xt−1 +E[ℓˆ
i
t|At−1]− ℓit = Xt−1.
Its differences are bounded: |Xt−Xt−1| ≤ Bˆt. By
Azuma’s inequality, its actual value at time T does
not exceed
√
(2ln 4
δT
)
∑T
t=1Bˆ
2
t w.p. 1− δT2 . ✷
We now combine the above results and derive an up-
per bound on the expected regret of FoE against an
adaptive adversary.
Theorem 7 [FoE against an adaptive adversary] Let
n be finite and ki = lnn for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let ηt be
decreasing, and ℓt∈ [0,Bt]n some possibly adaptive as-
signment of loss vectors. Then for all experts i,
ℓFoE1:T ≤ ℓi1:T +
√
(2 ln 4
δT
)


√√√√ T∑
t=1
B2tn
2
γ2t
+
√√√√ T∑
t=1
B2t


+ lnn
ηT
+
T∑
t=1
ηtB
2
t n
2
γt
+
T∑
t=1
γtBt w.p. 1− δT and
EℓFoE1:T ≤ ℓi1:T + lnnηT +
T∑
t=1
ηtB
2
tn
2
γt
+
T∑
t=1
γtBt
+
√√√√(2 ln 4
δT
)
T∑
t=1
B2tn
2
γ2t
+ δT2
T∑
t=1
Btn
γt
.
Proof. The first high probability bound follows by
summing up all excess terms in the above lemmas,
observing that Bˆt=Bt(n/γt). For the second bound on
the expectation, we take expectations in Lemmas 2-5,
while Lemma 1 is not used. For Lemma 6, a statement
in expectation is obtained as follows: (3) fails w.p. at
most δT2 , in which case ℓˆ
i
1:T−ℓi1:T ≤
∑T
t=1Bˆt. ✷
Corollary 8 Under the conditions of Theorem 7,
(i) Bt ≡ 1 ⇒ EℓFoE1:T ≤ ℓi1:T +O(n2T
3
4
√
lnT ),
(ii) Bt ≡ 1 ⇒ ℓFoE1:T ≤ ℓi1:T +O(n2T
3
4
√
lnT ),
(iii) Bt = t
1
8 ⇒ EℓFoE1:T ≤ ℓi1:T +O(n2T
7
8
√
lnT ),
(iv) Bt = t
1
8 ⇒ ℓFoE1:T ≤ ℓi1:T +O(n2T
7
8
√
lnT ),
for all i and T . Here, (ii) and (iv) hold with probability
1−T−2. Moreover, in both cases (bounded and growing
Bt) FoE is asymptotically optimal, i.e.
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
(
ℓFoE1:T −min
i
ℓi1:T
) ≤ 0 almost surely.
Bt= t
1
8 in (iii) and (iv) is just one choice to achieve
asymptotic optimality while the losses may grow
unboundedly. Asymptotic optimality is sometimes
termed Hannan-consistency, in particular if the limit
equals zero. We only show the upper bound.
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow by applying the previous
theorem to ηt=t
− 1
2 , γt=t
− 1
4 , δT =T
−2, and observing∑T
t=1t
α≤ ∫ T+10 tα≤ 2(T+1)1+α for α≥− 12 . In order
to obtain (iii) and (iv), set ηt = t
− 3
4 , γt = t
− 1
4 , and
δT = T
−2. The asymptotic optimality finally follows
from the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, since
P
[
1
T
(ℓFoE1:T −mini ℓi1:T ) > CT−
1
8
√
lnT
]
≤ 1
T 2
for an appropriate C>0 according to (ii) and (iv). ✷
For t=1,2,3,...
Sample rt∈{0,1} independently s.t. P [rt=1]=γt
If rt=0 Then
Invoke FPLτ (t) and play its decision
Set ℓˆit=0 for i∈{t≥τ}
Else
Sample It w.r.t. ut in (5) and play I :=I
FoE
τ
t
Set ℓˆIt =ℓ
I
t/(u
I
tγt) and ℓˆ
i
t=0 for i∈{t≥τ}\{I}
Set ℓˆit= Bˆt for i 6∈{t≥τ}
Figure 3. The algorithm FoEτ
Sample qit
d.∼Exp independently for i∈{t≥τ}
select and play IFPLt =argmin
i:t≥τ
{ηtℓˆi<t+ki−qit}
Figure 4. The algorithm FPLτ (t)
4. Infinitely Many Experts and
Arbitrary Priors
The following considerations are valid for both finitely
and infinitely many experts with arbitrary prior
weights wi. For notational convenience, we write
n=∞ in the latter case. When admitting infinitely
many experts, two difficulties arise: Since the prior
weights of the experts sum up to one and thus become
arbitrarily small, the estimated losses – obtained by
dividing by these weights – would possibly get arbi-
trarily large. We therefore introduce, for each expert
i, a time τ i≥1 at which the expert enters the game. All
algorithms FoE , FPL, IFPL are substituted by coun-
terparts FoE τ , FPLτ , IFPLτ which use expert i only
for t≥τ i. Thus, the maximum estimated loss possibly
assigned to these active experts is
Bˆt = Bt/[γtmin{wi : t ≥ τ i}]. (4)
We denote the set of active experts at time t by {t≥
τ}= {i : t≥ τ i}. Experts which have not yet entered
the game are given an estimated loss of Bˆt. This also
solves the computability problem: Since at every time
t only a finite number of experts is involved, FoE τ is
computable (if each expert is). The algorithms FoE τ
and FPLτ are specified in Figures 3 and 4.
Again, the analysis follows the outline (1). Lemmas
1–4 have equivalent counterparts, the proofs of which
remain almost unchanged. In Lemma 3, the “uniform”
distribution over experts ut now becomes
uit = w
i1It≥τ i/[
∑
j w
j1It≥τ j ]. (5)
The upper bound on the estimated loss Bˆt in Lemma
4 is given by (4). We only need to prove assertions
corresponding to Lemmas 5 and 6.
Lemma 9
[
ELˆIFPL
τ<
∼Lˆ
best
τ ]
Assume that
∑
ie
−ki ≤ 1
and τ i depends monotonically on ki, i.e. τ i≥τ j if and
only if ki ≥ kj. Assume decreasing learning rate ηt.
For all T ≥1 and all 1≤ i≤n, we have
T∑
t=1
Etℓˆ
IFPL
τ
t ≤ ℓˆi1:T + k
i+1
ηT
.
Proof. This is a modification of the corresponding
proofs in [KV03] and [HP04b]. We may fix the ran-
domization A and suppress it in the notation. Then
we only need to show
EℓˆIFPL
τ
1:T ≤ min
1≤i≤n
{ℓˆi1:T + k
i+1
ηT
}, (6)
where the expectation is with respect to IFPL’s ran-
domness q1:T .
Assume first that the adversary is oblivious. We define
an algorithm A as a variant of IFPLτ which samples
only one perturbation vector q in the beginning and
uses this in each time step, i.e. qt ≡ q. Since the ad-
versary is oblivious, A is equivalent to IFPLτ in terms
of expected performance. This is all we need to show
(6). Let η0 =∞ and λt = ℓˆt+(k−q)
(
1
ηt
− 1
ηt−1
)
, then
λ1:t= ℓˆ1:t+
k−q
ηt
. Recall {t≥ τ}={i : t≥ τ i}. We argue
by induction that for all T ≥1,
T∑
t=1
λAt ≤ min
T≥τ
λi1:T +max
T≥τ
{
qi−ki
ηT
}
. (7)
This clearly holds for T =0. For the induction step,
we have to show
min
T≥τ
λi1:T +max
T≥τ
qi−ki
ηT
+ λAT+1 ≤ λ
IAT+1
1:T (8)
+ max
T+1≥τ
qi−ki
ηT+1
+ λ
IAT+1
T+1 = min
T+1≥τ
λi1:T+1 + max
T+1≥τ
qi−ki
ηT+1
.
The inequality is obvious if IAT+1∈{T≥τ}. Otherwise,
let J=argmax
{
qi−ki : i∈{T ≥τ}}. Then
min
T≥τ
λi1:T +max
T≥τ
{
qi−ki
ηT
} ≤ λJ1:T + qJ−kJηT =
T∑
t=1
ℓˆJt
≤
T∑
t=1
Bˆt =
T∑
t=1
ℓˆ
IAT+1
t ≤ λ
IAT+1
1:T + max
T+1≥τ
{
qi−ki
ηT+1
}
shows (8). Rearranging terms in (7), we see
T∑
t=1
ℓˆAt ≤min
T≥τ
λi1:T+max
T≥τ i
{
qi−ki
ηT
}
+
T∑
t=1
(q−k)IAt ( 1
ηt
− 1
ηt−1
)
.
The assertion (6) – still for oblivious adversary and
qt≡q – then follows by taking expectations and using
Emin
T≥τ
λi1:T ≤ min
T≥τ
{ℓˆi1:T+ k
i
ηT
−E qi
ηT
}
(∗)
≤ min
1≤i≤n
{ℓˆi1:T+ k
i−1
ηT
}
and E
T∑
t=1
(q − k)IAt ( 1
ηt
− 1
ηt−1
)≤Emax
T≥τ
{
qi−ki
ηT
}≤ 1
ηT
.
Here, (∗) holds because τ i depends monotonically on
ki, and Eqi=1, and maximality of ℓˆi1:T for T <τi. The
last inequality can be proven by an application of the
union bound [HP04b, Lem.1].
Sampling the perturbations qt independently is equiv-
alent under expectation to sampling q only once. So
assume that qt are sampled independently, i.e. that
IFPLτ is played against an oblivious adversary: (6) re-
mains valid. In the last step, we argue that then (6)
also holds for an adaptive adversary. This is true be-
cause the future actions of IFPLτ do not depend on its
past actions, and therefore the adversary cannot gain
from deciding after having seen IFPLτ ’s decisions. (For
details see [HP04a]. Note the subtlety that the future
actions of FoE τ would depend on its past actions.) ✷
Lemma 10
[
Lˆbest
τ<
∼L
best
]
For each T ≥ 1, δT ∈ (0,1),
and 1≤i≤n, we have ℓˆi1:T ≤ℓi1:T+
√
(2ln 4
δT
)
∑T
t=1Bˆ
2
t+∑τ i−1
t=1 Bˆt w.p. 1− δT2 .
This corresponds to Lemma 6. The proof proceeds in a
similar way: we have to note that ℓˆi1:t−ℓi1:t is a martin-
gale only for t≥ τ i, and ℓˆi
<τ i
exceeds ℓi
<τ i
by at most∑τ i−1
t=1 Bˆt. Then the following theorem corresponds to
Theorem 7 and is proven likewise.
Theorem 11 [FoE τ against an adaptive adversary]
Let n be finite or infinite,
∑
ie
−ki≤1, τ i depend mono-
tonically on ki, and the learning rate ηt be decreasing.
Let ℓt some possibly adaptive assignment of (true) loss
vectors satisfying ‖ℓt‖∞≤Bt. Then for all experts i,
we have
ℓFoE
τ
1:T ≤ ℓi1:T +
√
(2 ln 4
δT
)


√√√√ T∑
t=1
B2t
γ2t (w
∗
t )
2 +
√√√√ T∑
t=1
B2t


+ k
i+1
ηT
+
τ i−1∑
t=1
Bt
γtw
∗
t
+
T∑
t=1
ηtB
2
t
γt(w∗t )
2 +
T∑
t=1
γtBt
with probability 1−δT , where w∗t = min{wi : t ≥ τ i}.
A corresponding statement holds for the expectation
(compare Theorem 7).
Corollary 12 Assume the conditions of Theorem 11.
Then for all i and T , the following holds w.p. 1−δT .
(i) Bt ≡ 1, τ i = ⌈(wi)−8⌉
⇒ ℓFoE1:T ≤ ℓi1:T +O
(
( 1
wi
)11 + T
7
8
√
lnT
)
, and
(ii) Bt = t
1
16 , τ i = ⌈(wi)−16⌉
⇒ ℓFoE1:T ≤ ℓi1:T +O
(
( 1
wi
)22 + T
7
8
√
lnT
)
.
Corresponding assertions are true for the expectation
(compare Corollary 8). In both cases (bounded and
growing Bt) FoE is asymptotically optimal w.r.t. each
expert: lim supT→∞
1
T
(
ℓFoE1:T −ℓi1:T
)≤0 a.s. for all i.
Proof. Let ηt = t
− 3
4 , γt = t
− 1
4 , and δT = T
−2. For
τ i= ⌈(wi)−α⌉ and Bt= tβ, we have w∗T =min{wi :T ≥
⌈(wi)−α⌉}≥min{wi :T− 1α ≤wi⌉}≥T− 1α and
τ i−1∑
t=1
Bˆt ≤ (τ i − 1)Bˆτ i−1 ≤ (w
i)−αB
τi−1
γ
τi−1
w∗
τi−1
≤ (wi)−α(wi)−αβ
(wi)
α
4 wi
(observe w∗
τ i−1≥(τ i−1)−
1
α ≥(wi)(−α)(− 1α )). Then set
α=8, β=0, for (i) and α=16, β= 116 for (ii). Asymp-
totic optimality is shown as in Corollary 8. ✷
5. Active Expert Problems and a
Universal Master Algorithm
If the adversary’s goal is just to maximize our (ex-
pected) regret, then it is well known what he can
achieve (at least for uniform prior, see e.g. the lower
bound in [CB97, ACBFS02]). We are interested in dif-
ferent situations. An example is the repeated playing
of the “Prisoner’s dilemma” against the Tit-for-Tat1
strategy [FM04]. If we use two strategies as experts,
namely “always cooperate” and “always defect”, then
it is clear that always cooperating will have the bet-
ter long-term reward. It is also clear that a standard
expert advice or bandit master algorithm will not dis-
cover this, since it compares only the losses in one step,
which are always lower for the defecting expert.
We therefore propose to give the control to a selected
expert for periods of increasing length. Precisely, we
introduce a new time scale t˜ at which we have single
games with losses ℓ˜t˜. The master’s time scale t does
not coincide with t˜. Instead, at each t, the master gives
control to the selected expert i for T˜t single games and
1In the prisoner’s dilemma, two players both decide in-
dependently if thy are cooperating (C) or defecting (D). If
both play C, they get both a small loss, if both play D,
they get a large loss. However, if one plays C and one D,
the cooperating player gets a very large loss and the de-
fecting player no loss at all. Thus defecting is a dominant
strategy. A Tit-for-Tat player play C in the first move and
afterwards the opponent’s respective preceding move.
receives loss ℓit=
∑t˜(t)+T˜t−1
t˜=t˜(t)
ℓ˜i
t˜
. Assume that the game
has bounded instantaneous losses ℓ˜i
t˜
∈ [0,1]. Then the
master algorithm’s instantaneous losses are bounded
by T˜t. We denote this algorithm by FoE T˜ or FoE
τ
T˜ .
Corollary 13 Assume FoET˜ (or FoE
τ
T˜ , respectively)
plays a repeated game with bounded instantaneous
losses ℓ˜i
t˜
∈ [0,1]. Let the exploration and learning rates
be γt = t
− 1
4 and ηt = t
− 3
4 . In case of uniform prior,
choose T˜t=⌊t 18 ⌋ (τ i≡0). In case of arbitrary prior let
T˜t= ⌊t 116 ⌋ and τ i = ⌈(wi)−16⌉. Then for all experts i
and all T˜ , suppressing the dependence on the prior of
expert i, we have
ℓFoET˜1:T˜ ≤ ℓi1:T˜ +O(T˜
9
10 ) w.p. 1− T˜ 2 and
EℓFoET˜1:T˜ ≤ ℓi1:T˜ +O(T˜
9
10 ).
Consequently, lim supT→∞(ℓ
FoET˜
1:T˜ −ℓi1:T˜ )/T˜ ≤ 0 almost
surely. The rate of convergence is at least T˜−
1
10 . The
same assertions hold for FoEτT˜ .
Proof. This follows from changing the time scale from
t to t˜ in Corollaries 8 and 12: t˜ is of order t1+
1
8 in the
uniform case and t1+
1
16 in the general case. Then the
bounds are T˜
8
9
√
lnT˜ in the former and T˜
15
17
√
lnT˜ in
the latter case. Both are upper bounded by T˜
9
10 . ✷
Broadly spoken, this means that FoE T˜ performs
asymptotically as well as the best expert. Asymptotic
guarantees for the Strategic Experts Algorithm have
been derived by [FM04]. Our results approve upon
this by providing a rate of convergence. One can give
further corollaries, e.g. in terms of flexibility as defined
by [FM04].
It is also possible to specify a universal experts algo-
rithm. To this aim, let expert i be derived from the
ith program pi of some fixed universal Turing machine.
The ith program can be well-defined, e.g. by repre-
senting programs as binary strings and lexicographi-
cally ordering them [Hut04]. Before the expert is con-
sulted, the relevant input is written to the input tape
of the corresponding program. If the program halts,
the appropriate number of first bits is interpreted as
the expert’s recommendation. E.g. if the decision is
binary, then the first bit suffices. (If the program
does not halt, we may for well-definedness just fill its
output tape with zeros.) Each expert is assigned a
prior weight by wi = 2−length(p
i), where length(pi) is
the length of the corresponding program and we as-
sume the program tape to be binary. This construc-
tion parallels the definition of Solomonoff’s universal
prior [Sol78]. This has been used to define a universal
agent AIXI in a quite different way by [Hut04]. Note
that like the universal prior and AIXI, our universal
agent is not computable, since we cannot check if a pro-
gram halts. It is however straightforward to impose a
bound on the computation time which for instance in-
creases rapidly in t. If used with computable experts,
the algorithm is computationally feasible. The univer-
sal master algorithm performs well with respect to any
computable strategy.
Corollary 14 Assume the universal set of experts
specified in the last paragraph. If FoEτT˜ is applied with
γt = t
− 1
4 , ηt = t
− 3
4 , T˜t = ⌊t 116 ⌋, and τ i = ⌈(wi)−16⌉,
then it performs asymptotically at least as good as any
computable expert i. The rate of convergence is expo-
nential in the complexity ki and proportional to T˜−
1
10 .
6. Discussion
For large or infinite expert classes, the bounds we have
proven are irrelevant in practice, although asserting al-
most sure optimality and even a convergence rate: the
exponential of the complexity is far too huge. Imag-
ine for instance a moderately complex task and some
good strategy, which can be coded with mere 500 bits.
Then its weight is 2−500, a constant which is not distin-
guishable from zero in all practical situations. Thus,
it seems that the bounds can be relevant at most for
small expert classes with uniform prior. This is a gen-
eral shortcoming of bandit experts algorithms: For
uniform prior a lower bound on the expected loss which
is linear in
√
n has been proven [ACBFS02].
If the bounds are not practically relevant, maybe the
algorithms are so? We leave this interesting question
unanswered. Intuitively, it might seem that the al-
gorithms proposed here are too much tailored towards
worst-case bounds and fully adversarial setups. For ex-
ample, the exploration rate of t−
1
4 is quite high. Mas-
ter algorithms which are less “cautious” might perform
better for many practical problems. Finally, it would
be nice to investigate the differences between the pro-
posed expert style approach and other definitions of
universal agents, such as by [Hut04].
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